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Abstract
The Philippines is an Asian nation which has a long and
complex relationship with the West. And so its philosophy and cultural
heritage shares this same complexity. What is Filipino philosophy?
In what sense can it be said to be Medieval or Modern? The first
major part of this preliminary work discusses the meaning of medieval
philosophy, modern philosophy, and philosophy itself. The second part
gives a philosophical understanding of the works of Abstract artist
Nena Saguil in order to describe how visual artists can be a source of
philosophical thought in a non-traditionally philosophical culture,
and to describe the course modernity has already taken in other
humanistic disciplines.
When I had an opportunity to meet Prof. John Maraldo, a student
of Rahner who had become an expert in Japanese and Chinese Philosophy,
I asked him if I could write a paper comparing Nishitani and Filipino
Philosophy. He asked me a question that I had not been able to answer up
to now: “What would be the sources of Filipino philosophy?”  The incident
turned out to be very significant because it made me realize that what
seemed very obvious was virtually unknown to me. At that time the paper
would have meant comparing Ferriols’s Pambungad sa Metapisika1 to
Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness2.
Maraldo, however, was asking the more fundamental question of
sources (mga bukal) of our philosophy, i.e., where our philosophy comes
from.  He might have been asking for specific texts and authors, but he
could also have been asking for the history of our philosophy. In the Ateneo
de Manila philosophy department, the usual suspects are French and
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German thinkers, such as Gabriel Marcel, Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas,
Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Jürgen Habermas, as well as Thomas Aquinas and Thomists like Norris
Clark. Nevertheless, Maraldo’s question made me ask other questions:
1) What can a culture that is not traditionally philosophical take as sources
of philosophy?  Can poets and artists be other sources for what we can
consider its own brand of philosophizing (pamimilosipiya)?
On the other hand, a decade ago, David Keck and Jose M. Cruz
S. J. held a round-table discussion on Medieval Influences in Philippine
Culture3 where I proposed to study the scholastic philosophy that was
current in philosophical education since the time of the Spaniards and
continued into the American and post-war eras. In the meantime,
acquiescing to institutional demands, I decided to work on Medieval
Philosophy for my doctorate. In 2002, I completed my text on Nicholas
of Cusa’s metaphysics and political philosophy under Prof. Jos Decorte,
who suddenly died from a vehicular accident. Through fellow medievalists,
I discovered books by the medievalist Jorge Garcia who has also written
on Latin American philosophy.4 This led me to ask how we can write the
history of philosophy in the Philippines. This task imposed itself upon me
as a kind of a moral duty, especially since when one skims through
encyclopedias of Philosophy,5 one will see entries on Asian Philosophy
that would have no mention of anything on the Philippines.
Although many would see the importance of writing the history of
our intellectual culture, few would agree with the use of the rubric of the
Middle Ages in analyzing our thought. Aren’t we putting the horse before
the carriage, i.e., deciding a particular direction in performing the task we
have just set out to do? Indeed, this author consciously chooses to use the
rubric of the European Middle Ages to understand the development of
philosophy in our country. Why? Firstly, he hopes that eventually historical
evidence can be presented that the Spaniards did bring in medieval thinkers
and used them in their evangelizing work. The fact that these missionaries
were Augustinians, Franciscans, and Dominicans (as well as Jesuits)6
already present prima facie evidence that the importation of medieval
ideas in our country was not marginal in the way the colonizers dealt with
and reconstituted the existing culture. Such introduction, however, could
already have begun when the Muslims came here. Is it possible that the
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Muslim religious leaders brought with them the Arabic learning that have
been developed by thinkers such as Avicenna and Averroes?  Finally, to
ask our question implicitly asks another question, that is, is Filipino thought
modern? In fact, we undertake this inquiry to know whether we are still in
the threshold of modernity and, more importantly, how we can enter into
it definitely.
Methodologies
The question we pose presents some serious methodological
problems. One can treat it as a historical problem:  If we surmise that our
thought is medieval, are we reducing it to the Philosophy brought by the
Spaniards and the Americans? This leads to the basic problem of when
we started doing philosophy. I already mentioned that perhaps it began
earlier when Islam spread to the Philippines. It is also possible that the
Chinese and Hindu settlers also brought their own philosophies albeit not
systematically. Could this explain why we have an ethical as well as Gnostic
side to our thinking? We would also wish to know when the Spaniards
began teaching western philosophy here.  This is a problem that can be
answered through the manuals and text books still kept in the Archives of
religious orders, and also through the literature and art done during these
times.7  The Propaganda movement and the birth of the Ilustrado probably
mark a different phase of philosophy in the Philippines. This is most likely
the earliest moment our thought tried to enter into modernity. Was this a
movement offset by the American Occupation when they continued
teaching philosophy through the scholastic manuals? Did the professors in
State universities try to continue the modernization efforts initiated by the
Ilustrados by introducing Anglo-Saxon philosophy? In the Ateneo, the
break from Scholasticism started with the introduction of Phenomenology
and Existentialism. How did this staunchly Catholic university try to move
away from “traditional philosophy,” especially after Vatican II and during
the Martial Law years? How come it preferred the French thinkers over
Marx and Nietzsche?
 Another method we can use is that of the History of philosophy
and ideas. We now have to take into account the place of the history of
philosophy itself in the philosophical culture. How we look at the history
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of philosophy certainly reflects our own philosophy and how we will write
our own history of philosophy. A simpler question would be how current
Filipino philosophers use the history of philosophy? In other words, how
do they lend authority to what they are saying, by referring to Thomas or
Augustine? Or to Kant or Hegel? Or to Foucault or Habermas?
Do Filipino philosophers present the history of philosophy in their
own terms and purposes? What would be the consequence if we relied
on the Anglo-Saxon synthesis of philosophical history? Shouldn’t we in
fact look at the more Continental European tradition? Certainly, the
Spaniards, who consider some of its 18th century Jesuit philosophers greater
than Descartes, would present the history of philosophy differently.8
We can also use the method of philosophy itself. Does our
philosophy begin with metaphysics in the same way most medieval thinkers
did. Do we in fact begin with ethics or philosophy of nature? Can we,
however, trace our streak of anti-intellectualism to a form of Franciscanism
that favored asceticism over the intellectualism of the Jesuits?
Perhaps one would say that true Filipino philosophy is the one
unsullied by western philosophers. At this point what becomes clear is our
true question, that is, what is philosophy? Jan Aertsen says, however, that
philosophy is defined by its own practitioners. Philosophy in the course of
history, as well as colonization, liberation, dictatorship, and peaceful
revolutions have been defined by those who do it. It bears a self-
understanding independent of what other philosophies in other times and
cultures have done.9
The first major part of this preliminary work discusses the meaning
of medieval philosophy, modern philosophy, and philosophy itself. The
second part gives a philosophical understanding of the works of Abstract
artist Nena Saguil in order to a) describe how visual artists can be a source
of philosophical thought in a non-traditionally philosophical culture and b)
to describe the course modernity has already taken in other humanistic
disciplines.
Medieval Philosophy
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Roque Ferriols translates Ancient Greek Philosophy as “Sinaunang
Pilosopiyang Griyego.”10  Should we translate medieval as “gitnang
panahon” and modern as “makabago?” Our word for modern, in fact,
influences the way we look at the traditional. Is it justified to call it “maka-
luma?”11
How we answer our question for this paper depends on how we
define medieval and modern. Bertrand Russell, in fact, did not think that
there was philosophy independent of theology in the middle ages. On the
other hand, what Medieval Philosophy is has recently been an object of
reflection among medievalists, proving that the question is a hotly debated
topic. Jan Aertsen provides us with a summary of the dispute.  He begins
with Pierre Hadot, who is actually a Greek Philosophy scholar.12 Hadot
maintains that for the ancients philosophia had, first and foremost, an
existential dimension: “It was not so much a system of thought but a “way
of life, a spiritual exercise preparatory to wisdom.” Carlos Steel, however,
uses Hadot’s thesis in order to argue that medieval philosophy is “an
impossible project.”13 If philosophy is search for happiness, and if happiness
can only be found in theology or in the Christian religion, then Islamic
philosophy and Greek philosophy is impossible, that is not capable of
reaching its goal. In his adherence to Hadot, Steel wishes to criticize Alain
de Libera’s approach to medieval philosophy, and rejects the thesis “that
masters in the faculty of arts represent the true “essence” of medieval
philosophy.”14 He also points out the fact that Thomas Aquinas radically
rejected the idea of a philosophical way to happiness.
Steel’s contention is significant because it questions the reduction
of medieval philosophy to the Gilsonian idea of “Christian philosophy.”
Aertsen points out that in the Middle Ages, the expression “Christian
philosophy” stood for the monastic life. For Gilson, however, this notion is
the authentic medieval philosophy whose uniqueness cannot be understood
apart from its relationship to Christianity.15 This means that medieval
philosophy is the twin sister of theology or what is called sacra doctrina.
Hadot disagrees with Gilson’s reduction of philosophy in the Middle Ages
to Christian philosophy because he thinks that Christian ideas, such as the
incarnation and the Trinity, transformed ancient philosophy. Such a view is
mistaken insofar as it misses the continuity between ancient and medieval
and forgets the existential aspect of medieval philosophy. It has also given
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the false impression that philosophy in the middle ages serves only the
purposes of theology.
Aertsen thinks that through Hadot’s thesis, one can say that there
is philosophy independent of theology even in the middle ages. He also
shows that Steel’s thesis presupposes that “the conception of philosophy
as promising salvation were normative.”16 In other words, the medieval
thinkers did rule that a system has to lead to salvation in order for it to be
counted as philosophy. Aertsen’s article, in fact, shows that the middle
ages developed a self-critical philosophy that set down limits to the reason
itself: “it was a possible project because medieval philosophy was a critical
philosophy, reflecting on the human condition of knowledge.”17
This is not the place to take sides on this issue; but through this
summary of the debate, we see that none of the historians think that
medieval philosophy is scholasticism nor is it simply Christian philosophy.
From here, however, we can ask very crucial questions: a) can we say our
philosophy is medieval because it is scholastic and Christian, b) can we
assume that although we have outgrown scholasticism we have ceased to
refer to the medieval world view, c) to what extent have Filipino
philosophers used medieval or scholastic or Christian sources, d) and
how have they used these sources in their own brand of philosophizing?
Modern Philosophy
Since it is not very clear what medieval philosophy is, should we
then take the negative route, and ask whether our philosophy is modern.
Aertsen’s article is a good example of why the question of the medieval
necessarily brings one to the question of the modern, for he himself has a
short discussion on what modern philosophy is. He says: “This ideal of
ancient philosophy nearly disappeared in the Modern Age, and today,
especially in the university milieu, philosophy is usually conceived of as a
purely theoretical manner.”18  This point of view states that modern
philosophers have lost the wholeness of life, especially the unity between
the practical and theoretical. After philosophy became a servant of theology,
it eventually exercised autonomy and later dominated it. This became the
mark of modernity. Different from Aertsen, we view modernity not
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necessarily as a step down in the ladder, nor do we think that the task of
the philosophy is simply to return to traditional wisdom. One can only live
in the age he is born in, and his task is to bring his age to other and higher
possibilities.
For the purposes of this paper we refer to Louis Dupré’s article
“The Modern Idea of Culture: Its Opposition to Its Classical and
Christian Roots.”19  Dupré, an ex-Jesuit who started as a Marx scholar
and became an astute historian of philosophy, philosopher of religion and
culture, and a Cusanus scholar, thinks that modernity is characterized by
the turn from nature to culture, the turn to subjectivity, and the loss of
transcendence.
Giving the examples of Hesiod and Lucretius, Dupré explains that
the opposition between nature and culture is an ancient problem. The
Greeks symbolized each by the mythical figures. Hercules stands for the
success nature accords to those who diligently obey her laws; while
Prometheus stands for the depths one will fall if he revolts against nature
and tries to steal the treasures of the gods. Dupré thinks that traditional
man did not try to dominate nature, but conformed to its workings, while
modern culture sought independence from nature and eventually controlled
it. Modernity no longer thinks that there is an intrinsic rationality, an order
manifested in the eternal dance of the spheres. On the other hand, it thinks
that rationality means the quantification of nature: “Instead it (nature) has
become what we entrap and control as a calculable, predictable force.”20
At this point, culture has come to mean the refusal to accept nature as
given. Human craftsmanship changed from techne to technological control
and ownership of nature.
The radical turn of modernity is thus from nature to subjectivity;
we begin to look at reality no longer from the point of view of what is
objectively out there and that which we can discover (pagtuklas), and
recognise what is out there is what is constituted by us (itinatakda).  The
example par excellence is René Descartes, who thought that the primary
idea (clair et distinct) is his own existence. For him, what is true is his
own being that becomes clear in the very act of doubting. Descartes says
also that if the object of knowledge is outside that which is clear and
distinct, it can only be known through the subject’s categories. Modernity
has stipulated that the self is a self-constituting subject, and that reality is
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not what is out there but what one thinks. Popular psychology summarizes
this view when it advices that a situation is not decided by what has
happened but how one looks at it.
Dupré, however, thinks that the idea of a constitutive subjectivity
turned against man himself. “What began as a radical subjectification of
the real ended by reducing the subject itself to the mere function of
constituting objectivity in the theoretical and the practical order.” He gives
the example of Marx who eventually placed man as a part of the product
of productivity itself. Marx has placed the absolute priority onto praxis,
where in man constitutes both himself and his world.21
When man turns to himself as self-constituting subject, his self-
assertion resulted into a loss of transcendence. Dupré does not only describe
the Nietzschean death of God, but the loss of man’s capacity to go beyond
immanence. The assertion of the self through his systems and technology
has actually obscured man’s very self. The categories he created have
absorbed him, for now he is an organism that evolved like any other. Now
he is living an immanentist existence, wherein God is simply part of the
other choices in life. The divine no longer occupies as special place in
reality, but is simply another aspect of reality, just like sports and
entertainment.
Obviously Dupré’s view of how modernity changed human culture
is not completely accurate.  He has, for example, not explained how
modernity contributed in the development of politics and society. I warn
my students in my philosophy of religion class that the opposition between
the traditional and the modern is not identical to the opposition between
good and evil. Would it, however, be fair to say that our philosophy is not
modern because it is imbued with religious and metaphysical concerns?
Certainly, modernity has led to the loss of transcendence in most
parts of the world, especially in the developed countries. We can ask
whether we can be Christian and modern? Once a priest from South
Africa and I talked about the lack of Christian identity in the Katholieke
Universiteit in Leuven. But then we realized how radically privileged we
were, sitting in cafeteria just like ordinary Belgians, and having full rights
as their citizens. Belgian society is such that if there are hierarchies, these
hierarchies are neither rigid nor exclusive. Can one not say that since their
society is more humane that it is more Christian than a church-going society?
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What is (Filipino) Philosophy?
At the root of our question, however, is what philosophy is and
whether there is such a thing as Filipino philosophy. In this regard, the
rubric of medieval philosophy is truly helpful. For Aertsen, in explaining
the definition of medieval philosophy, says that “what philosophy is and of
what it is capable are to be determined by philosophy itself.” Philosophy
has its own self-understanding. For most philosophers, the definition of
philosophy is moot and academic; once you have done, it is very clear to
you when you’re doing it. As Ferriols drummed into our young heads
before, “Philosophy is easier to do than to define.”22
Is there Filipino Philosophy?  Is our philosophy similar to existential
and practical philosophy of Ancient Greece and Rome and of the European
Middle Ages.  Is our philosophy that which cannot be separated from
religion?  Is philosophia that which the Spaniards used in order to do
away with the existing beliefs and ethical systems?  We can continue to
debate and write on these questions, but it is certain that philosophy in the
Philippines has its own self-understanding, which when he has done it,
one knows what it is.
Modernity, Art and Philosophy: The Case of Nena Saguil
Perhaps, however, the sources of Filipino philosophy are not only
found in commonly accepted texts but also in art and literature. 23 What is
surprising is that most of our early modernists are artists and writers. One
prime example is Alejandro Abadilla, who is not coincidentally a Philosophy
Major from UST.24 In this last part of our paper, however, we shall talk
about the modernity of the woman painter Nena Saguil. Our discussion
will show how a Filipino has already traversed the path from the traditional
to the modern.25
Saguil embodies the myth of the Filipino intellectual who has to
leave his country to find enlightenment (Ilustrisimo). Most Filipinos who
study abroad eventually end up losing their first naiveté, especially with
regard to their religion. Some recover it, leaving their agnostic stage and
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become more enlightened believers. On the other hand, Saguil who would
never be a balik-bayan, converted from Catholicism to the Church of
Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Eric (Emmanuel) Torres characterizes her art as a transition from
the material to the spiritual.26 Even so, her art is not reducible to this, for it
is not marked by a single conversion but a continuous evolution. Unlike
Picasso, who has varied periods, Saguil’s art reveals a search for personal
clarity and the appropriate artistic style for such clarity. What is significant,
however, is that her search for the divine did not make her less of a
modernist. The modernity and abstraction is not simply a moda, but a
conviction or a way of seeing the world.
Where does her personal modernity begin?27  First, her modernity
is in longing for freedom, which she finds in “Flight” (1962). Indeed, she
had to leave her house in Manila and go abroad to find liberation, and yet
once she found the locus of her freedom, i.e. Paris, Saguil would never
leave it.  In the process, she became the “first woman to pioneer in non-
figurative, purely abstract, art.”28  Saguil took abstraction as the medium
of this freedom. This viewer, however, thinks too that she was using her
painting to depict her life-story. One does not associate her art to the
ideas nor events, but a kind of autobiography or confession. The impulse
of the viewer is to attach the frame to her life.29
Then, her abstractness takes a more definition and focus. She
began drawing The Tunnel, which cannot be dissociated from a road or a
train trip and thus from journey.30 The works about tunnels bring to mind
not only the Paris metro system, but also the trains system and numerous
tunnels that burrow through the European mountain ranges. The tunnel
works impart the incessant comings and goings referring to progress and
movement.
Nevertheless, the full meaning of the tunnel actually becomes
unambiguous through the Inscape paintings.31 Her Inscapes should be
studied in relation to Landscape painting itself, not only of Saguil’s but the
whole of Philippine art.32  Landscape also refers to the land both as political
as well as an economic issue.33 To the mind of the author, the Landscape
meant prison, the limits of artistic possibilities in her own country. For this
reason, when she found freedom abroad, she depicted the core of the
land: the tunnel. Saguil, however, could also have depicted another symbol
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Nena Saguil,
“The Island” 1970
oil on canvas mounted on wood (tondo)
110 cm. (diameter).
Collection Ateneo Art Gallery.
Gift of Benjamin Saguil Jr.
Courtesy of Ramon E.S. Lerma, Curator
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of progress, namely, the skyscraper. One can say that this did not interest
her at all because none of the works in the exhibition showed the usual
fascination for the monuments in Paris. Even more fascinating is that her
early Parisian works were on the subject matter of the Night.34 Yet, even
the painting “Paris by Night” (1956) does not really bear any indication
that it could not be anywhere else.35
In this regard, her painting of “The Lamppost” (1956) is significant.
Having gone to Paris in the 1950’s, she would have reached the time
when those lampposts ran on gas, and would have witnessed their
electrification. Up to now, the modernization of cities begins with
improvement on street lighting. Saguil demonstrates her genius by painting,
rather than just its light, the alluring form of the post and its place in the
frenzied city. Compare this to the depiction of the lamp in an earlier painting
which gave off neither light nor life.36
If one goes back to the Inscape paintings, one notices playfulness
in the drawings that is also found in Pop art. Yet the series is a true exemplar
of how a person would draw his own mind. How are we to understand
the word Inscape?  In terms of art, it stands in contradistinction to
Landscape. Is Inscape about the Self or is it about the mind?
Saguil’s abstraction, although it is also about freedom, differs greatly
from expressionism. For her abstraction used a very specific figurative
language:  the circle, the semi-circle, the line. The colors are very distinct
too. The composition is stunning too, there is not one stroke of pen,
especially in the Triptych Series, that needs to be changed. In this sense,
she continues the task of the landscape artist, who portrays the external
order of the physical world. In her case, however, the ordering is internal,
while the movement is upward and expansive, reminiscent of a cathedral.
Saguil’s modernity, then, would not conform to the one Dupré
described. Most Christian thinkers have deplored modern art, especially
abstract art. Dupré’s essay on modernity reveals the same bias. If we
look at the works of Saguil, however, there is not the same violation of
humanity Dupré talks about.37 In her works, the self is completely herself,
and yet she does not get lost in her own categories or even in her own
expression. Furthermore, Saguil includes the viewer in the conversation
that goes on between the artist and her self as well as her Self. Just like in
Rothko, abstraction in these works is truly spiritual.38 Indeed her choice
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to make Inscapes rather than landscapes distances her from the Romantic
artists who wish to experience their inhibited self in nature. Instead, her
modernity is an individuation through the experience of the religious, where
the self is truly herself within the interior order.
The religious evolution continued until she found Illumination.39
Regardless of the possible reference to Rimbaud, no one can deny the
reference to Augustinianism in this regard.40 It was also during this time
that she converted to being a Jehovah’s Witness. Can one say that
Illumination is the discovery of the One God through His own the gift of
knowledge?  We notice that sometimes Saguil depicts illumination in black
and white, and sometimes in bursts of colors. The colors of the Illumination
paintings have come very far from the colors of the Manila period. The
later ones are pristine, and are truly light, both in the sense of being
luminescent as well as not being ponderous.
The final turn is the turn to Space.41 In at least one later work
there is centering as well as simplification. The centering, however, might
deceive us into thinking that the painting is about the forms, but rather it is
about space. It talks about how figures make one see the space, which is
not the subject matter in all the other paintings. Most of her work manifest
the same horror for emptiness (or love of fullness) found in most Filipino
art. Again one can be deceived, for Emptiness is in the numerous circles.
For Saguil, space is not exterior but interior. Even so, in the late works,
she has converted from the over preoccupation for the interior space to
Space itself. She did not want also the freedom of individuality, but wanted
also to be in All.
Is the philosopher over reading the works of Saguil? Is he too
steeped in the medieval world to see that Saguil is not?  But the more he
looks at Triptych I (1977)42 the more sure he is that the inspiration is the
cathedral. Did not Nena live near the Notre Dame? But the Notre Dame
no longer meant for her the center of French Catholicism. It meant only
what is truly essential—the spiritual. The little girl who lived in front of the
Sta. Cruz church has now become the apostle of abstraction rather than
representation, of the Mind rather than of the land, of Illumination rather
than knowledge, of Space rather than form and color. The Triptych
drawings encapsulate how she no longer sees the incarnated and suffering
God, but instead the pure lightness and being of God, i. e., He who is.
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She has become modern, but in being modern she also embodied
what is essential in her communal self, that is God and religion. Saguil’s
modernity is not a discovery of a self constituting subject, but of a
transcendent light or the all-encompassing space. Contrary to Dupré ’s
assertion, her modernity does not exhibit dehumanization or a romantic
return to nature where the self communes more intimately with itself. Instead,
they speak of Illumination, wherein the mind understands through the
efficiency of divine light itself. In Saguil, however, this ethereal light appears
only at Night. For her, God does not rise in the morning but in twilight.43
Conclusion
This paper gave a very preliminary discussion of the question “Is
Filipino Thought Medieval?” Primarily using the method of philosophy, it
clarified the questions involved in answering the question, namely, the
definition of medieval, modern, and philosophy. At the same time, it
discussed the relevance of the question, especially to the writing of the
History of Philosophy in the Philippines. Finally, it discussed the work of
Nena Saguil to illustrate how a Filipino thinker has gone over modernity.
This also shows that thought transcends philosophy and that philosophy is
present in other areas like art. Nonetheless, the main message of this paper
has been that philosophy is not defined from the outside. Filipino philosophy
is decided by its own practitioners. At the same time, it can assume a
broad definition that can include the philosophy discernible in art,
architecture, and literature.
Addendum: The First Synod of Manila
The Sinodo de Manila refers to the Junta convoked by the first
Philippine bishop, Domingo de Salazar in 1581 and which ended in 1586.44
The documents pertaining to the Synod are three: A] Document 1: Archivo
de la Universidad de Santo Tomas (Manila), Seccion de Becerros, Tomo
14 Suma de una junta que hizo a manera de concilio el año 1582, para
dar asiento a las cosas tocantes al aumento de la fe, y justificacion de las
conquistas hechas ; y que en adelante se hicieren por los españoles. B]
Document 2: Árchivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (Roma), Seccion
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Philippinarum, Volumen 12, Folios 268-289v Junta i congregacion hecha
en la ciudad de Manila para aviso de los confesores y remedio de algunos
casos de abusos de las Islas Filipinas. 1582. C] Complementary Document:
AGI, Audiencia de Filipinas , 84 Tondo 17, de Octubre de 1581 « La
junta y resolucion que el obispo tomo sobre la execucion de la cedula de
los sclavos ».45
How can we prove that these texts can be sources of philosophy?
Can one use synodal texts for philosophy at all? Historians who have
studied the text would be first to say that the Synod’s “theological
conclusions were not drawn up on the basis of abstract principles
excogitated by theologians enclosed in their cloisters.”46 Although they
are clear that those present were theologians and not philosophers, this
does not mean that those present in the synods and those who drew up
the documents did not use philosophy at all. By pointing out that the
theological conclusions were not drawn from abstract but “concrete”
principles, the historian seems to be saying that there were practical
considerations involved in the resolutions of the Synod. These precepts,
however, have to be taken as examples of communal truth for they were
reached through discussions and not individual cogitation. These texts
belong to the conciliar tradition, which historians of political philosophy
have long studied as adumbrations of constitutionalism. They resemble
the conciliarist writings (e.g. Nicholas of Cusa’s De concordantia
catholica) insofar as they use theology and metaphysics to justify political
claims.47
The texts can be used as sources of philosophy for two main
reasons: a) there is enough historical evidence linking its protagonists with
philosophers like Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas. b)
Corollary, through the work of scholars like Cary Nederman, one can use
these texts as examples of medieval toleration.48
Francisco de Vitoria and Natural Law
Lucio Gutierrez states: “The Synod faithfully follows the teaching
of the Spanish theologian Francisco de Victoria” (1485-1546)49 He rightly
makes this claim because Vitoria was part of the dispute over the legitimacy
of the colonization of the Americas, “to which Vitoria alludes at the
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beginning of On the American Indians, began in 1513 when King
Ferdinand called a commission (junta) of theologians and civil and canon
lawyers to discuss the matter.”50  It was Vitoria who said that legitimacy of
sovereignty can only be derived from natural law.51 Failing to meet the
requirements of natural law, Spanish colonial presence, however, could
only be justified through laws of nations (ius gentium) which made room
for natural partnership and communication between nations, ius
peregrinandi, and ius predicandi,52 and just war.53
John Schumacher states that according to the texts of the Synod:
“The king of Spain had no natural law title to sovereignty over the
Philippines, supporting the earlier opinion of Fr. Martin de Rada that no
part of the Philippines had come under Spanish rule by any just war.”54
For this reason Schumacher explains the legitimacy of Spanish colonial
rule through what he calls supernatural sovereignty.55 The Spanish could
only stay in the Philippines on the following conditions: 1) that they had
commission to preach the Gospel; 2) that colonial presence did not give
the right to take away all authority from the pre-Hispanic native rulers;
and 3) that it meant the role of supervision to the extent necessary that the
Gospel be effectively preached.56
For Schumacher the relevance of the texts of the Synod goes beyond
demonstrating to us the thought prevalent in Manila in the latter part of the 16th
century; instead, it is an enduring testament to the need for the Church to
ponder on the principles of justice.57 It is also interesting that because he
wanted to draw up guidelines for the 1979 Synod of Manila, he uses a Vatican
II term to describe the synod’s underlying political philosophy; namely,
subsidiarity: “The governor…should put in the larger and more stable towns
Indio judges, elected by the Indios themselves, who should take care of general
justice and good order, and settle ordinary disputes.”58 The Synod thought
that those who would proximately rule Filipinos should be Filipinos themselves,
for Spanish sovereignty was legitimate only to the extent that it permitted the
spread of the Catholic faith.59
De las Casas and Toleration
There is also evidence of the possible link of the texts to Bartolome
de las Casas (1484-1566). Gutierrez quotes Salazar himself who said: “I
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was reared in the doctrine of the bishop of Chiapas [Las Casa].”60  Cary
Nederman takes de las Casas as an example of late medieval form of
toleration.61 Distinguished from Vitoria for not being a theologian who
disputed over the Americans in the safety of  the University of Salamanca,
“Bartolome de las Casas, had observed the process of conquest at first
hand and could draw on empirical as well as philosophical evidence to
refute justifications of Spanish imperialism.”62 Nederman considers him a
philosopher of toleration because he thought that conversion could not be
humanly effected through coercion: “To employ coercion is inhumane
because it fails to take into account that humanity is defined by possession
of certain inborn, but imperfectly realized, potentialities, it is uncivilized
because it mistakes occidental cultural development for a singular process
that no other people is capable of recapitulating, except perhaps at sword’s
point.”63 Thus, if non-Christians cannot be forced to be baptized into the
Catholic Church, the authorities in the Americas have to forbear the non-
Christian rites and beliefs until the natives themselves voluntarily embrace
the imported religion.64 Such toleration is the locus of dialogue, which the
missionary has to practice in order to remain true to himself as a Christian.
According to Schumacher, the texts of Synod indicate their
adherence to de las Casas’ principle of toleration: “What is more significant,
however, is some of the reasons given, which show an underlying respect
for the Filipinos and their personal dignity which contrasts not only with
that of the generality of the conquistadores but with that which even the
clergy would express in later times.”65 One indication that perhaps the
Synod upheld the principles of toleration is the ruling on the language to be
used for evangelization: “The momentous decision it took in this matter
was that the Filipinos were to be evangelized in their own languages, which
the missionaries should set themselves to learn, if they had not done so
already.”66 It must be emphasized that this decision of the Synod differs
from the directive given in 1555 for America. It also differs from the effort
to superimpose Spanish in the whole of Iberia itself. Schumacher explains
that not only was this a practical and effective evangelical strategy, but it
also demonstrates that the synod thought that “Filipino society, the
“republica de indios,” as it was called, had a right to existence of its own,
and that Spanish rule was only justified to the extent that it created conditions
necessary for preaching of the Gospel.”67 To a large extent this directive
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to missionaries to preach in the native languages changed the entire course
of Spanish presence in the Philippines. Although significant in the
preservation and development of the native languages, the decision not to
teach Spanish also set the Philippines behind Spain and the other colonies,
thus becoming an issue in the egalitarian efforts of the Propaganda
Movement. Language figures prominently too in the colonization process
of the United States which decided to teach English to the Filipinos.
In one sense the Synod of Manila is a logical consequence of what
has been going on in Spain since the 15th century. The place of the texts of the
Synod of 1581 in writing the history of philosophy in the Philippines is large,
not primarily because it used scholastic thought but because it is political
philosophy. This is evident not only in what historians have called its agenda of
justice but more especially in its links to Vitoria and de las Casas. Gracia pegs
the starting point of Hispanic philosophy to the time Spanish philosophers
began thinking about the territories in America.68 The texts of the Synod prove
that this is true in the Philippines as well. If we accept this as a starting point of
Western Philosophy in the Philippines then it means that a) Filipino thought
might be more interested in practical philosophy than in speculative and
metaphysical philosophy, and b) that the Spanish culture that came here had
roots in the Middle Ages.
Hopefully, this medievalism is not static but dynamically looks
forward to modernity. The texts of the Synod are significant only insofar
as they can be a source for reflection on democratic thought.69 The Synod
it must be remembered was not an extraordinary event in the process of
colonization for it came after two previous juntas: The Junta of Burgos
called by King Ferdinand in 1513 and the Ecclesiastical Junta of Mexico
in 1546. There is mention in the historical studies of many juntas (civil and
ecclesiastical) that were held in the Philippines. To what extent did the
experience of the juntas lead to the formation and development of
democratic thought among ordinary citizens as well as the founding of the
Katipunan? It is significant that our word huntahan, which means telling
stories, comes from the word Spanish junta. The texts of the Synod of
Manila tell us that our obsession for telling stories in the streets is indeed
an avenue towards democracy.
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